Caixa implements changes to PIX to protect lottery network against chargeback scams.
CAIXA presented a set of measures to mitigate risks in PIX operations carried out in the lottery network during a meeting with FEBRALOT and state unions held last Friday (February 13). The meeting discussed the Special Return Mechanism (MED) of PIX, an instrument regulated by the Central Bank for blocking and possible return of amounts in specific cases. BNLData had access to the document with the measures discussed.
During the meeting led by the Lottery Network Management (GERLO), CAIXA detailed the operation of the MED, which is activated when there are suspicions of fraud or operational failures in transactions. It is important to highlight that the Central Bank has done nothing and the statement does not indicate any change to the PIX MED, maintaining the management and regulation of the system under its responsibility.
How does the return mechanism work?
The MED process begins with the payer's bank reporting the incident to CAIXA, followed by the precautionary blocking of the disputed amount. The case is analyzed within seven days, after which the amount is released if no evidence of fraud is identified, or returned to the payer if the claim is deemed valid.
The mechanism was developed specifically for cases of scams, fraud, or technical failures, allowing victims to request a refund of improperly transferred funds. Under the current rule, customers have up to 80 days to dispute payments, a timeframe that is part of the official MED protocol, significantly hindering the defense of commercial establishments.
CAIXA has informed that the Central Bank has instructed individualized analyses of notifications involving lottery accounts, considering the activity, history, and operational profile of each unit. When undue charges of interest and IOF (Tax on Financial Operations) related to these transactions are identified, the amounts will be refunded to the lottery establishments.
Impacts of marking on DICT
One of the points discussed was the possibility of marking the lottery agency's CNPJ (Brazilian tax ID) in the DICT (Directory of Transactional Account Identifiers) database. This marking could result in the inability to use PIX, both for receiving and sending funds, at any financial institution.
CAIXA explained that this marking may occur as part of other institutions' own routines. The available defense procedures in these cases were presented to the lottery representatives, including the possibility of submitting documents, analysis of the situation, and potential appeal against the marking.
New security measures announced
To reduce risks in PIX transactions, CAIXA announced five main measures:
⇒ Creation of a specific defense workflow with employees specialized in the lottery process;
⇒ Reducing the validity of QR codes to just 10 minutes;
⇒ Implementation of user identification for PIX transactions starting February 23rd;
⇒ Suspension of Pix Withdrawal and Pix Change starting March 16th; and
⇒ Implementation, by March 31st, of transaction completion conditioned on the identification of the same paying/issuing user.
During the meeting, guidelines were reinforced regarding good operational practices and preventive measures that lottery outlets should adopt to avoid problems with the MED (Medical Device Management).
It is important to emphasize that CEF (Caixa Econômica Federal) has also done nothing so far, but has committed to creating additional resources in the process to mitigate the risks of losses until the end of March 2026. Of the actions promised by CEF, there is nothing that corrects or signals a definitive solution to the problem; in other words, the lottery network remains exposed to financial losses due to the use of PIX (Brazil's instant payment system).
Positive and negative aspects of the measures
Among the changes proposed by CEF, a positive point is highlighted as "the identification of the user making the PIX payment," since in practice this action, which is already used in the withdrawal process, tends to be more effective. With this information in hand, added to the request for an official document with a photo (ID card, driver's license, work card, passport, etc.), only the account holder will be able to make payments via PIX.
On the other hand, the "Suspension of Pix Withdrawal and Pix Change" is seen as a negative point, since it is a very useful and interesting feature for lottery retailers and the public, but in practice it will only penalize both sides.
Concerns of the lottery network
Lottery representatives expressed concerns about several aspects of the system, including issues related to the allocation of financial risk in refunds via MED (Electronic Money Transfer) and the operational impossibility of reversing bets already registered in the CAIXA (Brazilian Federal Savings Bank) system.
Concerns were also raised regarding the need for specific systemic treatment for lottery operations and the legal security of banking correspondents.
Negative points remain regarding the debiting of the disputed amount by the payer immediately after the dispute, forcing the lottery operator to take this amount out of their own pocket – an imminent risk impossible to calculate and, therefore, to prepare for. Furthermore, the suspension of PIX transactions for seven days remains in place, simply due to any dispute from any citizen and for any amount, which represents yet another punishment for lottery operators and the public.
How the scam works
Lottery business owners have reported fraud related to PIX's MED system. The scheme follows an identifiable pattern: scammers arrive at the lottery outlet, make a deposit or PIX withdrawal of significant amounts (R$ 1, R$ 2), and then request a refund. In Mogi das Cruzes, one lottery outlet suffered a refund of R$ 18 without explanation, facing a block on PIX operations from other institutions for a week during the investigation.
Since PIX transactions account for over half of all transactions at lottery outlets, malicious individuals visit these establishments, make purchases and financial transactions, and then later dispute the transactions. The problem also affects the betting sector, where unsuccessful bettors may attempt to recover money through chargebacks.
In the end, despite the discussions, little has been effectively resolved for the moment, with some promises that improve the situation but do not definitively solve the problem. CEF understands the magnitude of the problem and is trying to help, but the proposed actions may be insufficient in practice.
