Fraud distorts protection mechanisms and widens the advantage of the illegal betting market.

Three months after the launch of the Centralized Self-Exclusion Platform by the federal government, conceived as an instrument to protect vulnerable bettors and provide unified control of accounts on authorized betting sites, reports of misuse of the system in financial fraud schemes are multiplying. Sectoral surveys indicate that fraudsters are exploiting the time window between the processing of the self-exclusion request and the effective interruption of access to accounts, generating losses for operators, in addition to an increase in complaints to consumer protection agencies and lawsuits.

According to data released by the Ministry of Finance, in early 2026, the mechanism, operational since December 10, 2025, registered more than 217 self-exclusion requests, indicating high user adherence to the tool created to mitigate harm associated with problem gambling. However, according to executives of duly regulated fixed-odds betting platforms, some bettors were placing more audacious (and higher) bets in the interval between the self-exclusion request and the effective implementation of the block, subsequently demanding reimbursement on the grounds that they should not have been able to operate after formalizing their self-exclusion on the government platform.

“This type of opportunistic use not only impacts the economic sustainability of licensed operators, but also undermines the regulatory model itself and consumer protection mechanisms,” says Gustavo Biglia, partner at Ambiel Bonilha Belfiore Teixeira Hanna Advogados and specialist in Gaming and Betting Regulation. “When consumers use an instrument designed for individual protection to claim undue refunds, it creates a scenario of moral hazard and increased litigation within consumer law, harming companies that operate in accordance with current regulations and highlighting gaps that require urgent adjustments to the regulatory framework.”

For the iGaming market, which already faces significant regulatory compliance and oversight challenges in Brazil, this new type of fraud has a direct impact on the sector's credibility with investors, financial institutions, and consumer protection agencies. The proliferation of administrative proceedings and repeated complaints to consumer protection agencies (Procon), related to alleged losses resulting from the self-exclusion system, increases operational costs, amplifies legal uncertainty, and can negatively influence risk assessments and capital flows destined for the segment.

The Centralized Self-Exclusion Platform was implemented as part of a set of measures aimed at strengthening responsible gambling policies, reducing harm associated with gambling addiction, and integrating mental health prevention and care actions into sectoral public policies. The regulation that established the tool set a 90-day deadline for the systemic adaptation of authorized operators, precisely to allow for secure technical integration between the government platform and private systems. Even so, despite this formal adaptation period stipulated in the regulation, reimbursement requests and complaints based on situations that occurred during the implementation period have emerged, demonstrating conduct that deliberately disregards the express content of the regulation.

The system mandates that authorized operators block self-excluded users within 72 hours; however, the time asymmetry between the registration of the request and the effective technical implementation of the blocking has been exploited to obtain undue advantages. Furthermore, there are records of claims made by individuals who received marketing communications during this transition period and then alleged a supposed breach of self-exclusion, which reinforces indications of bad faith and opportunistic instrumentalization of public policy.

It is important to highlight that the Centralized Self-Exclusion Platform only applies to operators duly authorized and integrated into the regulated system, producing no practical effect on illegal websites operating outside of state supervision. This regulatory mismatch deepens the competitive asymmetry, because while licensed companies assume the costs of compliance, technological integration, and reputational risk arising from temporary operational failures, the clandestine market remains without effective oversight, without equivalent obligations, and without blocking mechanisms. The result is a structural imbalance between the demands imposed on the regulated sector and the countermeasures offered by the public authorities in terms of suppressing illegal activity, which may encourage users to migrate to unsupervised environments and compromise the very objectives of consumer protection and tax collection that underpinned the regulation.

It is important to emphasize that the oversight of the regulated market is thorough, continuous, and marked by rigorous technical requirements for compliance, reporting, and system integration. However, this same intensity of control is not replicated in relation to the illegal market, which continues to operate without effective supervision and practically without coercion. Specific measures such as the administrative blocking of domains prove insufficient, as new websites are created and made available in a matter of minutes, often hosted abroad and beyond the immediate reach of national authorities. This creates a scenario of regulatory asymmetry. The licensed operator bears high obligations, costs, and legal risks, while the clandestine agent operates with ample room for maneuver, which compromises competitive balance and weakens the very objectives of public regulatory policy.

Biglia argues that immediate regulatory adjustments and structural improvements to the flow of information between the platform, the Betting Management System (SIGAP), and the operators are urgent measures to prevent an instrument designed for social protection from being used as a mechanism for opportunistic arbitrage.

“The Platform came into effect on December 10, 2025, and the regulation itself established a 90-day period for systemic adaptation by the operators. Even so, we have observed claims made with total disregard for this transition period expressly provided for in the rule. This reveals not only opportunism but also contempt for the regulatory text. Furthermore, there are cases that go beyond the figure of the habitual bettor, involving individuals who did not even have an active account and began to allege irregularities based on the simple receipt of marketing communications, which reinforces clear indications of bad faith. If there is no swift technical correction and rigorous regulatory alignment, we run the risk of transforming a legitimate public policy of protection into a source of legal uncertainty, predatory litigation, and a disincentive to investment in the regulated market,” concludes the lawyer.