Brazil, betting, and the Macolin Convention: The Integrity of Sport Demands Consistency
Brazil has just taken an important step in the fight against corruption and the manipulation of sporting results. By becoming the first country in Latin America to sign the Macolin Convention of the Council of Europe, it reaffirms its commitment to the integrity of sport, international cooperation, and the credibility of competitions. It is a decision of significant institutional scope, which deserves recognition and support.
But it is also a decision that raises an unavoidable question: how to reconcile adherence to an international treaty that promotes cooperation between public authorities, sports organizations and betting operators with the recent decision to prohibit the regulated sports betting market?
The question is not a political provocation, nor does it call into question the legitimacy of the concerns that motivated the Brazilian government's decision. It is a demand for institutional coherence, public accountability, and the effectiveness of the policies adopted. And the answer is of interest to the government, the National Congress, the judicial authorities, the clubs, the athletes, the consumers, and all those who believe that sport should continue to be a school of values, and not a territory vulnerable to crime.
An international commitment that I have known since its inception.
On September 18, 2014, I had the honor of being present in Macolin, Switzerland, and participating in the opening ceremony for the signing of the Council of Europe Convention on the Manipulation of Sports Competitions, the drafting of which I followed and to which I actively contributed.
I recall that moment with particular significance. Not only because of the historical importance of the initiative, but above all because of the then widely shared conviction that the manipulation of sporting competitions represented a global threat that demanded an equally global response.
Formally adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on July 9, 2014, the Convention was opened for signature in Macolin during the 13th Conference of Ministers responsible for Sport, and entered into force on September 1, 2019.
It marked a milestone in the international recognition that the integrity of competitions requires much more than the punctual repression of illicit behavior. It requires institutions capable of preventing risks, identifying threats, sharing information, and acting in a coordinated manner.
Match-fixing undermines sporting integrity, athletes' rights, fan trust, the credibility of competitions, and the legitimacy of sporting organizations. When a competition ceases to be decided solely on sporting merit, the trust of an entire community is compromised.
The Macolin Convention was born precisely from the awareness that no country can confront criminal networks operating internationally in isolation, exploiting legislative differences, institutional weaknesses, and opportunities provided by new technologies.
Hence the centrality of cooperation between public authorities, sports organizations, regulators, betting operators, and specialized international bodies. This is not an accessory feature. It is one of the fundamental pillars of the Convention.
Its strength lies in its ability to transform shared information into prevention, intelligence into investigation, and commitments into results.
Twelve years later, I maintain the same conviction that guided that international commitment. It is precisely because I place so much value on the Convention that I consider it essential to analyze the Brazilian decision with rigor, independence, and a constructive approach.
The ban did not eliminate the illegal market. And it does not eliminate the risks.
On September 25, the Brazilian government issued Provisional Measure No. 1.394/2026, prohibiting the operation, offering, intermediation, and advertising of fixed-odds betting, including sports betting and online casino games.
The decision was based, among other reasons, on the need to protect families, combat indebtedness, reduce the risks associated with gambling addiction, and safeguard public health.
These are legitimate and serious concerns that deserve the utmost respect. The protection of consumers, particularly minors and people in vulnerable situations, must be an absolute priority of any responsible public policy.
No one should minimize the suffering caused by problem gambling, nor ignore its economic, social, and family consequences. Recently released data on the increase in work absences associated with pathological gambling reinforces the urgency of effective policies for prevention, education, treatment, and support for those affected.
But the legitimacy of the objectives does not preclude evaluating the means used to achieve them.
Banning an activity doesn't mean eliminating the demand for it. And eliminating the regulated market doesn't mean eliminating the illegal market.
In Brazil, this issue is no longer merely hypothetical.
On October 9th, the Ministry of Justice and Public Security itself announced that, since the publication of the provisional measure, more than 20 illegal betting and advertising websites had been identified and sent for blocking.
These are official figures that demonstrate the persistence of a significant clandestine supply, even after the ban came into effect.
It is essential, of course, to distinguish the identified websites from the actually active platforms, as well as to avoid presenting these numbers, without further verification, as an accurate measure of the migration of consumers or financial resources.
But the essential conclusion is unequivocal: prohibition did not eliminate illegal activity.
However, the closure of previously licensed operators removed from the national market entities subject to obligations regarding consumer identification, financial traceability, money laundering prevention, regulatory oversight, and reporting of suspicious transactions.
These instruments were not perfect. They could and should be improved. The existence of a regulated market does not, in itself, guarantee integrity, nor does it dispense with rigorous oversight and accountability of operators.
But it is important to recognize that its elimination profoundly alters the national architecture of control and supervision.
The state can block platforms, investigate criminal networks, and sanction clandestine activities. What it needs to demonstrate is that it can preserve, through other means, the monitoring and intelligence capabilities previously provided by the authorized market.
An activity that persists outside the regulated perimeter becomes more difficult to identify, monitor, and oversee. Illegal operations do not offer equivalent mechanisms for transparency, consumer protection, or cooperation with authorities.
Combating illegality requires the ability to identify it, investigate it, and hold its perpetrators accountable. Simply declaring it gone is not enough.
This is a concrete public policy problem. And it is also a central issue for the implementation of the Macolin Convention.
The Macolin Convention and the challenge of institutional coherence.
Articles 9, 10, and 13 of the Convention are particularly relevant for understanding the scope of the Brazilian challenge.
They establish measures related to the actions of the authorities responsible for regulating sports betting, the prevention and reporting of suspicious activities by operators, and the existence of a national platform for cooperation, analysis, and information exchange.
It is important to clarify an essential legal point: the Macolin Convention does not oblige States to legalize sports betting. Its primary objective is to prevent, detect, and punish the manipulation of competitions, respecting different national legislative options.
A country can therefore adopt a policy of prohibition and simultaneously legitimately adhere to the Convention. There is no automatic legal incompatibility between the two decisions.
But legal compatibility does not necessarily equate to operational coherence. And formal legality does not, in itself, guarantee effectiveness.
The challenge lies in demonstrating how the prevention, detection, and investigation mechanisms foreseen in the Convention will be preserved and strengthened, in a context where previously licensed operators cease to participate in the national market.
How will suspicious activity related to Brazilian competitions be identified when bets are placed on clandestine platforms or platforms based abroad? Who will provide the authorities with the necessary data to detect abnormal patterns, suspicious transactions, or potential manipulation attempts?
What mechanisms will ensure cooperation between Brazilian authorities, international monitoring bodies, sports organizations, and legally established operators in other jurisdictions? How will the national platform foreseen in the Convention be structured, financed, and operationalized?
These are concrete questions that require equally concrete answers.
The transnational nature of sports match-fixing makes permanent channels of communication and intelligence indispensable. A competition held in Brazil can be the subject of bets placed on several continents. An attempt at match-fixing may involve intermediaries, financial operators, and criminal organizations established in different jurisdictions.
It was precisely to confront this reality that the Macolin Convention established a model based on cooperation and information sharing.
Eliminating a national intelligence source does not make compliance with the Convention impossible. However, it requires demonstrating that alternative mechanisms exist that can ensure the continuity and effectiveness of prevention and investigation.
This is not to argue that betting operators should determine public policy. Regulation is a prerogative of the State and should be exercised exclusively in the public interest.
This means recognizing that the information needed to protect sporting integrity doesn't cease to be necessary just because the legislative model has changed.
The question is not whether Brazil can ban betting. It is whether, in doing so, it preserves the essential instruments for protecting sport, consumers, and society against crime.
This is the true demand for institutional coherence that the signing of the Convention brings to light.
Protecting families and protecting the integrity of the sport are not competing objectives.
One of the weaknesses of the Brazilian debate has been the tendency to present absolute choices.
On one hand, there is the unconditional defense of an economic activity, as if social and public health risks could be treated as secondary concerns. On the other hand, there is the conviction that prohibition, in itself, constitutes a guarantee of protection for citizens.
None of these positions fully addresses the complexity of the problem.
Public health, consumer protection, addiction prevention, sports integrity, combating money laundering, and suppressing organized crime are complementary responsibilities. They require a coordinated vision and effective implementation tools.
Brazil has the sovereign right to define the legal regime it deems appropriate. But it also has the responsibility to assess the consequences of its decisions and ensure that the instruments adopted are proportionate, effective, and compatible with the international commitments undertaken.
Strict regulation offers relevant instruments for prevention, protection, and oversight, provided it is accompanied by effective controls, deterrent sanctions, independent supervision, and appropriate measures to address problem gambling.
A prohibition policy, in turn, should be evaluated not only by the activities it formally prevents, but by the risks it effectively reduces, the clandestine practices it manages to combat, and the protection mechanisms it preserves.
The decisive criterion should be the demonstrable effectiveness of public policies, not their formal designation.
The protection of people cannot be sacrificed in the name of the market. But the ability to fight crime also cannot be weakened in the name of protecting people.
A responsible public policy must meet both requirements.
Brazil needs prevention, education, treatment, oversight, accountability, and legal certainty. It also needs to preserve its institutional capacity to combat criminal networks that exploit illegal activity, regardless of the legislative option adopted.
These are not incompatible objectives. They are dimensions of the same public responsibility.
From signing to implementation: the true test of leadership.
Over the past decade, the Sport Integrity Global Alliance (SIGA) has championed a simple yet demanding conviction: integrity in sport presupposes strong institutions, clear rules, defined responsibilities, effective cooperation, and independent evaluation mechanisms.
This is the spirit of our Universal Standards on Integrity in Sports Betting, which offer an international benchmark for preventing match-fixing, managing risk, protecting participants, and strengthening institutional integrity.
International experience demonstrates that there are no magic solutions. Prevention requires education, training, reporting mechanisms, early warning systems, intelligence sharing, effective investigations, and accountability.
None of these instruments work in isolation. And none can be replaced by declarations of good intentions.
Brazil has the institutions, technical expertise, sports organizations, and capacity for international cooperation to build a consistent response. The signing of the Macolin Convention should provide new impetus in this direction.
The signing represents the first formal commitment. Ratification and subsequent effective implementation of the Convention will constitute the next tests of Brazil's determination to transform this international commitment into concrete instruments for the prevention, cooperation, and combating of sports manipulation.
It would be particularly important for this commitment to be accompanied by the public presentation of a national implementation plan, identifying the responsible authorities, the permanent mechanisms for national and international cooperation, the sources of intelligence on suspicious activities, and the indicators used to assess the effectiveness of the measures adopted.
This plan should clarify how monitoring and investigation capabilities will be preserved, how the authorities responsible for sports integrity, public health, and combating crime will coordinate, and how any unintended consequences of the ban will be identified and addressed.
Independent evaluation should be integrated into this process from the outset. Not only to identify shortcomings, but also to recognize positive results and allow policies to evolve based on evidence.
This approach does not assume that Brazil must necessarily return to the previous regulatory model, nor does it anticipate decisions that fall under the purview of the National Congress and the Supreme Federal Court.
It does, however, require that any legislative option be accompanied by the instruments necessary for its effective implementation and the protection of the public interest.
Signing an international convention cannot be the end point of an integrity policy. It must represent the beginning of increased responsibility for implementation, transparency, and accountability.
An opportunity for Brazil to demonstrate leadership.
Brazil occupies a prominent place in world sport. The relevance of its competitions, the economic and social dimension of football, the international projection of its athletes, and the passion of millions of citizens for the sport give it responsibilities that extend beyond its borders.
Signing the Macolin Convention offers an opportunity to strengthen this position and contribute to a more effective international response to sports manipulation.
At a time when Provisional Measure No. 1.394/2026 remains subject to review by the National Congress and judicial scrutiny, it is important to ensure that the debate takes place with serenity, technical rigor, and a sense of institutional responsibility.
It is not SIGA's role to substitute itself for the Government, Congress, or the courts in the decisions that fall under their purview. Its role is to contribute, independently and constructively, to ensuring that these decisions are informed by the principles of good governance, international best practices, and verifiable evidence.
It is in this spirit that we welcome Brazil's commitment to the Macolin Convention and advocate for its implementation to be transparent, participatory, and subject to independent evaluation.
Brazil has all the conditions to demonstrate leadership in this matter. But leadership is not measured solely by the treaties a country signs. It is measured by the ability to transform commitments into policies, policies into results, and results into trust.
The challenge is not choosing between protecting citizens and protecting the integrity of sport. It is ensuring that both responsibilities are fulfilled, through coherent policies, effective instruments, and oversight mechanisms that withstand the test of reality.
Twelve years ago, in Macolin, I participated in a historic moment of international affirmation of this collective responsibility. Today, seeing Brazil take this step, I maintain the conviction we shared then: integrity requires more than good intentions. It requires political will, institutional cooperation, and the ability to produce results.
Signing an agreement is making a commitment. Fulfilling it demonstrates leadership.
And when the future of sport is at stake, consistency is neither a political luxury nor a legal formality. It is a matter of public responsibility.
(*) Emanuel Macedo de Medeiros is Co-founder and Global CEO of SIGA | President and CEO of SIGA LATIN AMERICA
